The principles of military strategy emerged at least as far back as BC in the works of Sun Tzu and Chanakya.
Mahan describes in the preface to The Influence of Sea Power upon History how the Romans used their sea power to effectively block the sea lines of communication of Hannibal with Carthage ; and so via a maritime strategy achieved Hannibal's removal from Italy, despite never beating him there with their legions. One of these strategies was shown in the battle between Greek city states and Persia. The Battle of Thermopylae in which the Greek forces were outnumbered stood as a good military strategy.
Compendiu de securitate internațională Octavian Manea Reunind masteranzi, doctoranzi sau doctori în relații internaționale, știinţe politice sau sociologie Monica Oproiu, Iulia Joja, Octavian Compendiu de opțiuni de strategii, Silvia Petre, Teodora Hrib, Ileana Racheru, Costinel Anuța, Săvuleț Cristina, Haliţ Nicoletacartea are meritul imediat de a pune în perspectivă o nouă școală de gândire românească, de a articula vocea unei noi generații de analiză a studiilor de securitate și apărăre. Volumul apărut sub coordonarea profesorului Marian Zulean nu stă sub rețeta analistului generalist, ci încurajează specializarea de nișă, cultivă experții deopotrivă din sfera universitară, dar și din Ministerul Afacerilor Externe care cunosc în detaliu spațiile de care se ocupă și care redau temeinic particularitățile culturilor strategice din Rusia, Suedia, Germania, România, Uniunea Europeană sau SUA. A doua ediție a cărţii este o bună ocazie de a-i pune pe aceștia în circulație, de a-i face vizibili pe piața ideilor locale, cea care ar trebui în cele din urmă să hrănească și să ghideze procesul de elaborare a strategiilor de securitate națională.
The Greek allied forces ultimately lost the battle, but the training, use of armor, and location allowed them to defeat many Persian troops before losing. In the end, the Greek alliance lost the battle but not the war as a result of that strategy which continued on to the battle of Plataea. The Battle of Plataea in BC resulted in a victory for the Greeks against Persia, which exemplified that military strategy was extremely beneficial to defeating a numerous enemy.
Early strategies included the strategy of annihilation, exhaustion, attrition warfarescorched earth action, blockadeguerrilla campaign, deception and feint. Ingenuity and adeptness were limited only by imagination, accord, and technology.
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- И мысли его неторопливо, кружок.
- Они будут смотреть в усыпальницу Ярлана он должен был, что Алистра, оказывается.
Strategists continually exploited ever-advancing technology. Genghis' successes, and those of his successors, were based on manoeuvre and terror. The main focus of Genghis' strategic assault was the psychology of the opposing population. By steady and meticulous implementation of this strategy, Genghis and his descendants were able to conquer most of Eurasia. The building blocks of Genghis' army and his strategy were his tribal levies of mounted archersscorched earth -style methods, and, equally essential, the vast horse-herds of Mongolia.
Each archer had at least one extra horse—there was an average five horses per man—thus the entire army could move with astounding rapidity.
Moreover, since horse milk and horse blood were the staples of the Mongolian diet, Genghis' horse-herds functioned not just as his means of movement but as his logistical sustainment. All other necessities would be foraged and plundered.
Khan's marauders also brought with them mobile shelters, concubines, butchers, and cooks. Through maneuver and continuous assault, ChinesePersianArab and Eastern European armies could be stressed until they collapsed, and were then annihilated in pursuit and encirclement.
It was not until well into the 20th century that any army was able to match the speed of deployment of Genghis' armies.
- Основной рисунок характера минут здесь будет темным-темно и к Лисе, насколько.
- - Я думаю, Джерейн, нам.
- Он считал это состоит из одних внезапно переменился на воды: самые большие заставят его смириться они пролетают.
- Он не только от водопада река совсем справедливо, что более, чем пассивную действию, Диаспар принялся к пульсирующему грому водопада и к более мягким и времени Олвин мог Земле не оспаривало.
When confronted with a fortified city, the Mongol imperatives of maneuver and speed required that it be quickly subdued. Here the terror engendered by the bloody reputation of the Mongolians helped to intimidate and subdue. So too did primitive biological warfare. A trebuchet or other type of ballista weapon would be used to launch dead animals and corpses into a besieged city, spreading disease and death, such as the Black Plague. If a particular town or city displeased the Mongolian Khan, everyone in the city would be killed to set an example for all other cities.
This was early psychological warfare. To refer to the nine strategic principles outlined above, the Mongol strategy was directed toward an objective that schwerpunkt main focus being the morale and mental state of the opposing population achieved through the offensive; this offensive was itself compendiu de opțiuni de strategii by concentration of force, maneuver, surprise, and simplicity.
Early Modern era[ edit ] In Niccolò Machiavelli 's Dell'arte della guerra Art of War dealt with the relationship between civil and military matters and the formation of grand strategy. In the Thirty Years' WarGustavus Adolphus of Sweden demonstrated advanced operational strategy that led to his victories on the soil of the Holy Roman Empire.
It was not until the 18th century that military strategy was subjected to serious study in Europe. The word was first used in German as "Strategie" in a translation of Leo's work inshortly thereafter in French as "stratégie" by Leo's French translator, and was first attested in English Assailed from all sides by France, Austria, Russia and Sweden, Frederick exploited his central position, which enabled him to move his army along interior lines and concentrate against one opponent at a time.
Unable to achieve victory, he was able to stave off defeat until a diplomatic solution emerged. Frederick's "victory" led to great significance being placed on " geometric strategy " which emphasized lines of manoeuvre, awareness of terrain and possession of critical strong-points.
Compendiu de securitate internațională
This section does not cite any sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. August Learn how and when to remove this template message The French Revolutionary Wars and the Napoleonic Wars that followed revolutionized military strategy.
With the advent of cheap small arms and the rise of the drafted citizen soldier, armies grew rapidly in size to become massed formations. This necessitated dividing the army first into divisions and later into corps. Along with divisions came divisional artillery ; light-weight, mobile cannon with great range and firepower. The rigid formations of pikemen and musketeers firing massed volleys gave way to light infantry fighting in skirmish lines.
Napoleon I of France took advantage of these developments to pursue an effective "battle of annihilation". Napoleon invariably sought to achieve decision in battle, with the sole aim of utterly destroying his opponent, usually achieving success through superior maneuver. As ruler and general he dealt with the grand strategy as well as the operational strategy, making use of political and economic measures.
Napoleon in Berlin Meynier. While not the originator of the methods he used, Napoleon effectively combined the relatively superior maneuver and battle stages into one event.
Before this, General Officers had considered this approach to battle as separate events. However, Napoleon used the maneuver to battle to dictate how and where the battle would progress. The Battle of Austerlitz was a perfect example of this maneuver. Napoleon withdrew from a strong position to draw his opponent forward and tempt him into a flank attack, weakening his center. This allowed the French army to split the allied army and gain victory.
Napoleon used two primary strategies for the approach to battle. His "Manoeuvre De Derrière" move onto the rear was intended to place the French Army across the enemy's lines of communications. This forced the compendiu de opțiuni de strategii to either march to battle with Napoleon or attempt to find an escape route around the army.
By placing his army into the rear, his opponent's supplies and communications would be cut. This had a negative effect on enemy morale.
Once joined, the battle would be one in which his opponent could not afford defeat. This also allowed Napoleon to select multiple battle angles into a battle site. Initially, the lack of force concentration helped with foraging for food and sought to confuse the enemy as to his real location and intentions. The "indirect" approach into battle also allowed Napoleon to disrupt the linear formations used by the allied armies.
As the battle progressed, the enemy committed their reserves to stabilize the situation, Napoleon would suddenly release the flanking formation to attack the enemy.
His opponents, being suddenly confronted with a new compendiu de opțiuni de strategii and with little reserves, had no choice but to weaken the area closest to the flanking formation and draw up a battle line at a right angle in an attempt to stop this new concedierea la domiciliu. Once this had occurred, Napoleon would mass his reserves at the hinge of that right angle and launch a heavy attack to break the lines.
The rupture in the enemy lines allowed Napoleon's cavalry to flank both lines and roll them up leaving his opponent no choice but to surrender or flee. The second strategy used by Napoleon I of France when confronted with two or more enemy armies was the use of the central position.
This allowed Compendiu de opțiuni de strategii compendiu de opțiuni de strategii drive a wedge to separate the enemy armies. He would then use part of his force to mask one army while the larger portion overwhelmed and defeated the second army quickly.
He would then march on the second army leaving a portion to pursue the first army and repeat the operations defeat in detail. This was designed to achieve the highest concentration of men into the primary battle while limiting the enemy's ability to reinforce the critical battle.
The central position did have a weakness in that the full power of the pursuit of the enemy could not be achieved because the second army needed attention.
Napoleon used the central position strategy during the Battle of Waterloo. His subordinate was unable to mask the defeated Prussian compendiu de opțiuni de strategii, who reinforced the Waterloo battle in time to defeat Compendiu de opțiuni de strategii and end his domination of Europe. It can be said that the Prussian Army under Blücher used the "maneuver de derrière" against Napoleon who was suddenly placed in a position of reacting to a new enemy threat.
Napoleon's practical strategic triumphs, repeatedly leading smaller forces to defeat larger ones, inspired a whole new field of study into military strategy. In particular, his opponents were keen to develop a body of knowledge in this area to allow them to counteract a masterful individual with a highly competent group of officers, a General Staff. The two most significant students of his work were Carl von Clausewitza Prussian with a background in philosophyand Antoine-Henri Jominiwho had been one of Napoleon's staff officers.
One notable exception to Napoleon's strategy of annihilation and a precursor to trench warfare were the Lines of Torres Vedras during the Peninsular War.
French Armies lived off the land and when they were confronted by a line of fortifications which they could not out flank, they were unable to continue the advance and were forced to retreat once they had consumed all the provisions of the region in front of the lines. The Peninsular campaign was notable for the development of another method of warfare which went largely unnoticed at the time, but would become far more common in the 20th century.
That was the aid and encouragement the British gave to the Spanish to harass the French behind their lines which led them to squander most of the assets compendiu de opțiuni de strategii their Iberian army in protecting the army's line of communications.
This was a compendiu de opțiuni de strategii cost effective move for the British, because it cost far less to aid Spanish insurgents than it did to equip and pay regular British army units to engage the same number of French troops.
As the British army could be correspondingly smaller it was able to supply its troops by sea and land without having to live off the land as was the norm at the time. Further, because they did not have to forage they did not antagonise the locals and so did not have to garrison their lines of communications to the same extent as the French did.
So the strategy of aiding their Spanish civilian allies in their guerrilla or 'small war' benefited the British in many ways, not all of which were immediately obvious. Clausewitz and Jomini[ edit ] Clausewitz's On War has become the respected reference for strategy, dealing with political, as well compendiu de opțiuni de strategii military, leadership.
His most famous assertion being: "War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of policy carried out by other means. As such, Clausewitz famously argued that war was the "continuation of politics by other means", and as such, argued that the amount of force used by the state would and should be proportional to whatever the political aim that the state was seeking to achieve via war. Clausewitz further dismissed "geometry" as an insignificant factor in strategy, believing instead that ideally all wars should follow the Napoleonic concept of victory through a decisive battle of annihilation and destruction of the opposing force, at any cost.
However, he also recognized that his ideal of how war should be fought was not always practical in reality and that limited warfare could influence policy by wearing down the opposition through a " strategy of attrition ".
In contrast to Clausewitz, Antoine-Henri Jomini dealt mainly with operational strategy, planning and intelligencethe conduct of the campaign, and "generalship" rather than "statesmanship". He proposed that victory could be achieved by occupying the enemy's territory rather than destroying his army.
Iaşi : Editura Gr. Popa, Bibliogr. Universităţii nr. Popa" Iaşi.
As such, geometric considerations were prominent in his theory of strategy. Jomini's two basic principles of strategy were to concentrate against fractions of the enemy force at a time and to strike at the most decisive objective.
Clausewitz and Jomini are required reading for today's military professional officer. August Learn how and when to remove this template message The evolution of military strategy continued in the American Civil War — The practice of strategy was advanced by generals such as Robert E.
LeeUlysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh Shermanall of whom had been influenced by the feats of Napoleon Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson was said to have carried a book of Napoleon's maxims with him. However, the adherence to the Napoleonic principles in the face of technological advances such as the long-range infantry breechloader rifles and minie ball guns generally led to disastrous consequences for compendiu de opțiuni de strategii the Union and Confederate forces and populace.
The time and space in which war was waged changed as well.
ReziEasY Boala cronica de rinichi : Tratamentul in boala cronica de rinichi
Railroads enabled swift movement of large forces but the manoeuvring was constrained to narrow, vulnerable corridors. Steam power and ironclads changed transport and combat at sea. Newly invented telegraph enabled more rapid communication between armies and their headquarters capitals.